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Abstract
The roles digital media-technologies play in raising public issues relating to
emerging technologies and their potential for engaging publics with science
and policy assessments is a lively field of inquiry in Science and Technology
Studies (STS). This paper presents an analysis of controversies over proposals
for the large-scale removal of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CDR). The study
combines a digital method (web-querying) with document analysis to map
debates about two CDR approaches: bioenergy with carbon capture and
storage (BECCS) and afforestation. In the first step, we locate actors using
the web to engage with BECCS and afforestation and map their alignments in
relation to competing framings of CDR. In a second step, we examine the
devices deployed by UK-based actors to evidence and contest the feasibility
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of BECCS and afforestation. Our analysis shows that policy distinctions
between “natural” and “engineered” CDR are used flexibly in practice and do
not map neatly onto actor engagement with BECCS and afforestation. We
highlight the predominance of cross-cutting techno-economic expertise and
argue that framings of CDR as a solution to governing climate change may
contribute to public disengagement from climate policy processes. The paper
reflects on methods for studying controversies, publics, and issues emerging
around processes of technoscientific assessment.
Keywords
digital methods, climate change, greenhouse gas removal, BECCS, affores-
tation, publics
Introduction
In the wake of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC
2014)1 Fifth Assessment Report, and the Paris Agreement of the following
year, a series of controversies erupted over levels of atmospheric carbon
dioxide removal (CDR) required to keep global temperature rise “well
below” 2C. The reliance by IPCC integrated assessment models on spec-
ulative “negative emissions technologies”—chiefly, bioenergy with carbon
capture and storage (BECCS)—to remove atmospheric carbon and achieve
politically desirable emissions scenarios proved controversial among cli-
mate scientists (Fuss et al. 2014). Moreover, the unproven status of most
CDR technologies has led to claims that the IPCC is providing cover for
political leaders’ failures to mitigate climate change risks (Anderson and
Peters 2016; Geden 2016). Some activists have argued that the scientific
integrity of the IPCC has been compromised, describing technologies like
BECCS as a gift to the fossil fuel lobby (Geoengineering Monitor 2018).
One prominent attempt to reframe debates about CDR, away from a focus
on technological innovation, has focused on the development of so-called
natural climate solutions (NCS). The NCS concept was prominently articu-
lated in a paper published by conservation NGO The Nature Conservancy in
collaboration with environmental and climate scientists (Griscom et al. 2017)
which proposed that a third of emissions reductions required by 2030 could
be achieved through land stewardship practices. In international climate pol-
itics, NCS are associated with the activities of the UN Convention on Bio-
diversity and attempts to connect climate and biodiversity issues (Buck
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2019). A campaign to promote NCS, fronted by prominent environmentalists
George Monbiot and Greta Thunberg, was launched in 2019 in a letter to the
UK’s Guardian newspaper, denouncing projections for the deployment of
BECCS as “likely to trigger either an ecological or humanitarian disaster
(Monbiot 2019).” A key focus of the NCS campaign, excluded from most
CDR assessments, is on the land rights of indigenous peoples and commu-
nities potentially at risk from forms of land grabbing associated with land-use
change (Climate Land Ambition and Rights Alliance [CLARA] 2018). How-
ever, others (Bellamy and Osaka 2020) argue that framing of climate solu-
tions as “natural” is also highly normative, and carries its own risks, including
that the range of options for removing atmospheric carbon is constrained on
the basis of their perceived desirability.
This paper examines debates about the role of CDR in climate futures,
the ways different actors are engaging in them, and the issues they raise.
Our study combines a digital method (web-querying) with document anal-
ysis to map issues emerging around the two CDR approaches most promi-
nently featured in the IPCC scenarios (Vaughan and Gough 2016): BECCS
and afforestation.2 In some climate policy analyses, controversies over
BECCS and afforestation are treated principally as disagreements about the
role technological innovation should play in government responses to cli-
mate change risks (Nemet et al. 2018). In contrast, this paper argues that
competing framings of CDR represent not only disagreements over policy
options but also over the issues that should be taken into account when
assessing the “realism” or “feasibility” of future climate scenarios. Our
analysis therefore contributes to a growing body of studies showing how
contestations over the framing of CDR raise questions about the kinds of
knowledge and practices that can authoritatively devise climate futures
(Beck and Mahony 2018; Bellamy and Lezaun 2017; McLaren et al. 2019).
The first section of this paper discusses controversies over CDR and the
problem of public engagement with assessments of the feasibility of
BECCS and afforestation in climate policy. We show why “issue publics”
take on particular significance in the context of CDR debates which, on one
hand, propose rapid and sweeping technological and environmental
changes while, on the other, often center on assessment processes under-
taken by small groups of scientific and policy elites. The methodology
discussion outlines the issue mapping approach, combining web-querying
with document analysis. The empirical analysis is divided into two subsec-
tions. The digital methods component maps alignments of different actors
around framings of CDR as a natural or engineered process. In the second
stage, we conduct an interpretative analysis of policy and civil society
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literatures addressing CDR in the UK, examining the devices politically
situated actors deploy to evidence and contest the feasibility of BECCS and
afforestation. In concluding, we argue that controversy over CDR is
unlikely to be containable within science-policy institutions and govern-
ance frameworks and offer some reflections on the method for mapping
issues developed in this study and its relation to other approaches to
locating publics in climate policy.
Controversies over CDR and Public (Dis)Engagement
Questions about how, and in what ways, “issue publics” emerge in socio-
technical controversies and the problems they pose to the epistemic and
political legitimacy of institutions organizing scientific assessments and
policy evaluation around emerging technologies currently constitute a
lively field of inquiry (Madsen and Munk 2019; Marres 2015; Chilvers,
Pallett, and Hargreaves 2018; Rogers, Sánchez-Querubı́n, and Kil 2015;
Venturini 2010). This has not always been the case in controversy anal-
ysis. As Marres (2007) argues, the resolution of disputes and the public
legitimation of technical decisions have often taken precedence over the
engagement of assessment processes with the public issues that emerge in
controversies. Experiments with participation have been widely under-
taken in the fields of science policy, technology, and environmental
assessment, but as Chilvers and Kearnes (2016) argue, many are plagued
by a “residual realism”: institutional framings of publics and participation
procedures are often privileged or taken for granted as political realities.
Innovating procedures to expand participation in technical
decision-making and technology assessment processes can therefore
(potentially) also obscure the issues that give substance to controversies
and, paradoxically, contribute to public disengagement from policy pro-
cesses (Irwin and Michael 2003; Lezaun and Soneryd 2007; Pallett and
Chilvers 2013).
Questions of public engagement are arguably highly pertinent to con-
troversies over CDR, which to date have taken place mostly within the
fields of climate science and policy with only limited empirical social
science analysis (Buck 2016; Markusson et al. 2020; Waller et al. 2020).
Research on perceptions of different CDR approaches has highlighted the
importance of perceived “naturalness” to public acceptance (see discussion
in Thomas, Pidgeon, and Roberts 2018). More recent mixed-methods per-
ceptions research (Cox, Spence, and Pidgeon 2020) suggests that public
acceptance may be conditioned by “temporal dilemmas” between the
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urgency to mitigate climate risks and the prospect that relying on future
CDR deployment may delay transitions to a sustainable society. These
public perceptions studies all found very low levels of preexisting knowl-
edge and awareness about CDR and the researchers’ methods required
information provision prior to participation (see discussion in Waller
et al. 2020). By highlighting low levels of public awareness, the perceptions
literature importantly suggests disconnects between controversies over
CDR in climate science and policy, on the one hand, and debates about
climate change as a popular concern in politics and news media. While
contemporary perceptions studies are often explicitly critical of “deficit”
models of the public (e.g., Cox, Spence, and Pidgeon 2020), the focus of
much perceptions research on the public “acceptability” of policy options
and the communication of climate science typically implies that contro-
versy of the kind generated by CDR proposals is, at least in principle,
resolvable within science and policy communities prior to public engage-
ment (see discussions in Irwin and Michael 2003; Chilvers and Kearnes
2016). In order to elaborate the value of an issue-focused approach to
studying CDR, it is therefore first necessary to briefly examine in more
detail the ways in which such controversies problematize institutional set-
tlements between climate science and politics.
The aftermath of the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment generated much contro-
versy within the integrated assessment modeling community over CDR in
general, but specifically over BECCS, which is relied on to provide large
quantities of “negative emissions” (Fuss et al. 2014). This is even more
obviously the case in the IPCC’s recent special report on the impacts of
1.5C warming (IPCC 2018) which requires CDR in all scenarios, only one
of which doesn’t rely on BECCS.
In practice, the concept of BECCS is far from straightforward to define
and only a handful of demonstration projects have so far been undertaken,
none of which represent the primary modeling imaginary of BECCS as a
technology for generating bioelectricity (Kemper 2015; McLaren et al.
2019). A report on the website Carbon Brief (Hickman 2016) describes
BECCS as an invention of energy systems modelers and climate policy
researchers in the early 2000s. Such accounts present BECCS as first of
all an invention that enabled energy systems models (and relatedly, the
IAMs used for IPCC assessments) to solve problems relating to emissions
limits and energy use (Vaughan et al. 2018). Such genealogies of BECCS
are significant in that they are mobilized both by climate policy analysts
attempting to assess the feasibility of IPCC projections and critics who
argue that BECCS is a “technological fix” (Low and Schäfer 2020;
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Markusson et al. 2017). Indeed, even energy system modelers question
whether BECCS can really be understood as a single “technology,” rather
than a combination of energy pathways (electricity, heat, and biofuels) and
technologies (combustion, gasification fermentation; Kemper 2015).
As reviews of the literature on CDR (Minx et al. 2018; Waller et al.
2020) highlight, there are significant asymmetries between the high
volumes of papers published on BECCS compared with other CDR
approaches like afforestation. By contrast, literatures on afforestation
broadly conceived (i.e., not specifically concerned with net CO2 removal)
are long-standing (Minx et al. 2018). Viewing all CDR approaches as
“technologies” therefore requires adopting a highly instrumental stance
toward land and ecosystems, valuing them principally in terms of their
capacity for carbon sequestration (McLaren et al. 2019). Moreover, strong
distinctions between BECCS and afforestation as different technologies
would overlook some obvious interconnections in the large-scale land-use
change required for planting trees and growing biomass.
Attending to the ways in which publics engage with the controversies
over climate assessments offers occasions for examining social and political
issues that may not be accounted for in assessment processes (Markusson,
McLaren, and Tyfield 2018). Such issues are likely to both shape how the
findings of assessments are interpreted and translated into practice
(Bellamy, Chilvers, and Vaughan 2016). Beck and Mahony (2018) show
how controversy over CDR has drawn attention to the role of the IPCC as an
organization that performs “boundary work” between climate science and
politics. They demonstrate that contestations over whether CDR projections
are realistic cannot be easily separated from competing epistemologies of
“integrated assessment,” and the roles that assessment devices like
“scenarios” and “pathways” play in constructing what is technologically
or politically feasible (or infeasible) in climate futures. Elsewhere, McLaren
et al. (2019) argue that assessing the feasibility of CDR approaches has
potential to deter mitigation efforts and therefore that CDR should be
treated as a “systemic issue” in climate politics, rather than merely a set
of policy options and alternatives. As Bellamy and Lezaun (2017) argue,
CDR is already so widely publicized as an engineering solution to climate
change that public engagement beyond the procedural legitimation of
policy options requires experiments in “unframing” the issue of climate
engineering. Attending to the issues that animate controversies over CDR
can therefore establish not simply the policy trade-offs between different
“technologies” but also concerns about the social and political futures that
CDR may bring forward (or foreclose).
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Issue Mapping Methods
The issue mapping approach taken in this paper combines a digital method,
web-querying, with a qualitative analysis of gray literatures on CDR. The
digital methods component locates actors that appear on the web when
querying for BECCS and afforestation and uses keywords queries to map
their alignment (and misalignment) with framings of CDR as a natural or
engineered process.3 In a second step, we examine policy and civil society
literatures about CDR among UK-based actors. Our analysis identifies three
key “devices” that UK-based actors deploy to engage with CDR and shows
how these devices complicate simplistic oppositions between natural and
engineered CDR.4
Digital methods—that is, methods involving digital media entities, for
example, hyperlinks, hashtags, time stamps (Rogers 2013)—are central to
issue mapping research and have been widely used to map debates about
climate change on the web (for instance, Pearce et al. 2019; Rogers and
Marres 2000; Venturini et al. 2014). Many recent studies have repurposed
search engines as devices for locating gray literatures and studying how
actors use the web to engage with controversial topics (Pallett, Chilvers,
and Hargreaves 2019; Rogers, Sánchez-Querubı́n, and Kil 2015). Our
approach in this paper uses search engines to construct “actor lists”—that
is, lists of websites that may be engaging the topic of study—that can
subsequently be queried (as domains) to explore how they engage with
issues (Rogers, Sánchez-Querubı́n, and Kil 2015). Such an approach can
generate “coarse signs,” showing rough partisanship and “alignment” of
different actor positions (see theoretical discussion in Marres 2007;
Rogers 2018). Central to this method is the use of “keywords” (or phrases)
as signifiers of engagement. We applied this digital method to explore
how web actors returned in search queries for BECCS and afforestation
position themselves in relation to framings of CDR as natural or
engineered.
All search queries to compile the actor lists were undertaken using
a clean research browser (i.e., clear of cookies, site data, and browser
history). We first queried Bing and Google search engines for
BECCS and afforestation-related terms, triangulating results returned
(i.e., keeping domains occurring in both results lists). The following
keywords were queried on each search engine and up to 1,000 results
were collected from each using a tool called the Search Engine
Scraper.5
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BECCS (n ¼ 2,336 results collected):
[bioenergy AND “carbon capture and storage”]
[bioenergy]
[“carbon capture and storage”]





The results lists returned from the search engines were screened
to exclude intermediary websites that are principally hosts or publishers
of information.6 Many results returned were links to scientific papers,
published and syndicated on various websites, and to university websites.7
Such results highlighted the centrality of scientific research in debates about
CDR. But they also illustrate a limitation of our method when applied to
websites, such as those of publishers and universities, that primarily host
information but which are occasionally used to engage the CDR debate, for
example, on blogs of research institutes.
The screened list of domains was then queried for the following keywords8:
[“negative emissions”], [“carbon sequestration”],9 [“nature-based solutions”/
“natural climate solutions”]10 with a cap at one hundred results. Domains with
no results for any of these keywords were removed on the assumption that,
while the websites may represent actors engaging with aspects of BECCS and
afforestation, they are not engaging with broader CDR debates. To visualize
the distribution of results between the actors on each list, we constructed
word clouds using the wordcloud library available for R (Fellows, 2018). The
resulting actor lists—BECCS (n ¼ 114) and afforestation (n ¼ 153)—were
then coded using an actor typology adapted from climate policy analysis
literature to test the extent to which web actors could be classified by
off-the-shelf political categories (see, e.g., Huitema et al. 2011).
In the second stage of research, we collected a corpus of policy and civil
society literatures produced by UK-based actors addressing CDR.
UK-focused literature provides a pertinent case through which to explore
more debates surrounding CDR. The UK government has long represented
itself in international negotiations as a “climate leader” having passed its
Climate Change Act in 2008 (Rayner and Jordan 2016) and in 2019 adopt-
ing a legally binding “net zero” emissions target for 2050 (set against 1990s
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levels). The UK has also provided the stage for recent “populist” strands of
climate politics to emerge, centered on calls for a declaration of “climate
emergency” (Hulme 2019).
To collect the literature, we compiled actor lists from relevant mem-
bership organizations, non-governmental organization (NGO) networks,
and trade and industry groups (list in Appendix B). We then undertook a
broad search of their websites to identify 2015-2020 publications (i.e.,
following the Paris Agreement), including any that held direct or indi-
rect relevance to the topic of CDR. Alongside this, we performed a
range of structured queries on gov.uk (the UK government’s publication
database) and conducted a search of Parliamentary select committee
reports. In addition, we included relevant documents that we came
across ad hoc (e.g., via colleagues or from news reports). We then
screened this document list to select for documents providing substan-
tive evidence of the “real-world” feasibility of BECCS and afforestation
and documents that address aspects of BECCS or afforestation that have
consequences for the net removal of atmospheric CO2 (e.g., the devel-
opment of CCS infrastructure). The documents were then subjected to
qualitative coding analysis according to a set of themes and questions
developed to compare how they construct the “real-world feasibility” of
BECCS and afforestation.11
Based on our analysis of the coded corpus, we identified three key
“devices” that actors use in these reports in different ways to engage with
debates about CDR. We conceptualize devices as material-semiotic entities
(Law 2008) that are deployed in processes of evidencing and contesting
claims about the feasibility of BECCS and afforestation (on devices and
public engagement, see Marres and Lezaun 2011). Three key engagement
devices we identify are (1) carbon accounting techniques, (2) scenarios and
counter-scenarios, and (3) demonstration projects.
Mapping the CDR Debate with Search Engines
The “coarse signs” generated by our use of search engines, which we
present here, invite some broad contrasts between both the kinds of actors
that are returned when querying for BECCS and afforestation and the ways
these actors engage with debates about CDR. We caution against interpret-
ing these maps as representations of public debate in general. Instead, we
propose that they are read as indicative of how different kinds of organiza-
tional actors use the web to engage the CDR debate and publicize their
particular causes.
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Government and industry groups are well represented in actor lists
returned by both BECCS and afforestation queries (see Table 1 for
breakdown). Clear differences emerge around NGOs, which feature far
more prominently in the afforestation list. The BECCS list contains a
large number of organizations that we coded “other,” all of which could
be said to be mediators between science and society, and include
research institutes and organizations (e.g., Centre for International For-
estry Research or the UK Energy Research Centre), learned societies
(e.g., the Royal Society), and science and technology assessment agen-
cies (e.g., the UK’s Energy Technologies Institute). A smaller propor-
tion of sites on the afforestation list were classified as “other,” which
(like “other” actors in the BECCS list) largely comprise organizations
mediating between science and society, including independent research
centers (e.g., Centre for International Forestry Research), science-led
climate activism (e.g., Ocean Foresters), and learned societies (e.g.,
Federation of American Scientists). Notably, for a digital methods
study, very few blogs were returned (none from BECCS queries) and
the three blogs returned from afforestation queries all belong to
organizations.
When these lists are queried for the [“negative emissions”] and
[“nature-based solutions”/“natural climate solutions”] (herein NCS) key-
words, we can detect patterns of alignment between different actors.
Table 2 shows the distribution of results returned for each keywords
Table 1. Actor Types for Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS)
and Afforestation Web-actor Lists (Percent).
Actor Type
BECCS List
(Percent) Afforestation List (Percent)
Governments and regulators 17 27
Private companies/organizations 22 18
Transnational initiatives 3 5
International organizations 10 10
NGO 9 24
Trade association 8 0
Political party or think tank 8 5
Advisory or scrutiny bodies 3 3
Trade union 1 0
Blog 0 3
Other 19 6



















































































































































































































































































































































when applied to the domains on BECCS and afforestation actor lists
(capped at 100 results). The keywords “carbon sequestration,” a term
that does not map neatly onto oppositions between natural/engineered
CDR, resonates with more actors in each list than either of the more
partisan keywords. Both “negative emissions” and NCS keywords
appear somewhat resonant with the BECCS actor list. By contrast, the
keywords “negative emissions” hardly resonates at all with afforestation
actors.
Figure 1. Word cloud showing resonance of keywords [“negative emissions”] on
bioenergy with carbon capture and storage actor list. Random layout. Names sized
by web pages returned for keywords (0–100), visual scale of 10-1. High-resolution
image available on request.
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We visualized this data using word clouds to show the relative visibility
of individual actors on each list (Figures 1–4).
The word clouds constructed from the BECCS actor list suggest some
distinct alignments of actors that loosely correspond to climate policy differ-
entiations between energy (“negative emissions” word cloud) and land
sectors (NCS word cloud). Visible in the former word cloud are the Interna-
tional Energy Agency, power company Drax, the UK Carbon Capture and
Storage Association, and other CCS-related organizations. Visible in the
NCS word cloud are the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Centre for
International Forestry Research, the US Department of Agriculture, and the
European Environment Agency. Some actors, however, appear
Figure 2. Word cloud showing resonance of keywords [“natural climate solutions”]
on bioenergy with carbon capture and storage actor list. Random layout. Names sized
by web pages returned for keywords (0–100), visual scale of 10-1. High-resolution image
available on request.
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conspicuously out of place in relation to such thematic groupings: Fern, the
forestry NGO, appears prominent in the “negative emissions” word cloud
while Shell appears prominent in the NCS word cloud. The latter examples
suggest that actors may use “negative emissions” and NCS keywords for a
variety of reasons, for example, for commercial publicity12 or policy
critique.13
Such thematic distinctions appear much harder to draw for the word
clouds constructed from the afforestation actor list. Of the few actors on
the afforestation list using the keywords “negative emissions” most also
appear in the BECCS list, for example, the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC), the European Commission, and the World
Figure 3. Word cloud showing resonance of keywords [“negative emissions”] on
afforestation actor list. Random layout. Names sized by web pages returned for
keywords (0–100), visual scale of 10-1. High-resolution image available on request.
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Resources Institute. In contrast, the NCS keywords returns a multitude of
actors from the afforestation list, across actor categories. This illustrates two
key points: first, that while “negative emissions” is a keywords that is
central to CDR policy debates, it does not appear to resonate with affor-
estation actors, suggesting that the latter are disconnected from (or at least
do not engage with) a key discourse in contemporary climate policy.
Figure 4. Word cloud showing resonance of keywords [“natural climate solutions”]
on afforestation actor list. Random layout. Names sized by web pages returned for
keywords (0–100), visual scale of 10-1. High-resolution image available on request.
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Second, that the NCS keywords resonates with heterogeneous actors sug-
gests that this keywords is used flexibly and may have multiple associa-
tions, likely owing to the fact that afforestation is a long-standing object of
climate science and politics (even if in the context of CDR debates it is
primarily deployed for offsetting, rather than for net removals of, atmo-
spheric CO2).
From the “coarse signs” generated by search engines, we can draw out
some key points that problematize the simple oppositional framing of CDR
debates. While we can draw contrasts between the actor types that populate
BECCS and afforestation actor lists, many actors can be classified accord-
ing to off-the-shelf categories of policy analysis. Actors that do not fit
within policy analysis typologies appear primarily to be organizations med-
iating between science and society. The latter are particularly conspicuous
on the BECCS actor list and may reflect asymmetries in science-policy
dynamics relating to CDR research, for example, economic incentives to
stimulate research and development of BECCS but not afforestation (see
Nemet et al. 2018). The resulting view of the searchable-web is one dom-
inated by organizational publicity. This is in part an artifact of our method,
which screened out many sites of online social interaction such as wikis or
social media platforms. Yet, the relative comprehensiveness of climate
policy analysis categories suggests a view of the debate centered on insti-
tutional problem definitions of CDR and governance-related topics. None-
theless, the keywords “carbon sequestration” appears more resonant with
both BECCS and afforestation actors than either “negative emissions” or
NCS keywords. This finding raises questions about the extent to which
oppositional framings of CDR might overstate the differences between
natural and engineered CO2 removals. Moreover, it suggests that interpre-
tations associating “negative emissions” and NCS keywords with strongly
partisan positions toward CDR might obscure other dynamics of engage-
ment between actors in these debates.
Devices of Engagement: How UK-based Actors
Evidence and Contest CDR Futures
The web publicity analyzed above affirms the visibility of natural and
engineered framings of CDR. But our analysis also suggests that these
framings do not account entirely for the ways in which BECCS and affor-
estation actors engage with CDR. The following analysis of literature pub-
lished by UK-based actors focuses on how oppositional framings of CDR
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(described above) are complicated by the devices that actors use to evidence
and contest claims about the feasibility of BECCS and afforestation.
The lists used to search for documents comprised very varied kinds of
actors, including, for example, local conservation groups and community
organizations. However, our search only returned documents from organi-
zations that could easily be described as policy elites and groups typically
engaging with established policy processes. NGOs are the largest actor type
in the corpus (see Table 3). Several reports (by NGOs, government and
advisory bodies) are produced in collaboration with consultancies, Vivid
Economics is one such consultancy involved in three reports. This fact
highlights both the prominence of particular economic expertise and its
deployment by diverse actors. Of the UK-based actors we find online,14
ten are authors in this document corpus. These actors feature principally in
the BECCS online actor list, with only the Rewilding Britain and Climate




NGO The Woodland Trust, Rewilding Britain,
Greenpeace UK, Biofuel Watch, and Friends




The Committee on Climate Change; The
House of Commons Select Committee on
Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy; The
House of Commons Environment, Food and
Rural Affairs Committee; The House of
Lords Science and Technology Committee;
and The Natural Capital Committee
7
Other The Royal Society & Royal Academy of
Engineering, Scottish Carbon Capture &
Storage, The Centre for Climate Change
Economics and Policy, and Energy Systems




The Department for Business, Energy and
Industrial Strategy; The Scottish
Government; and Scottish Forestry
3
Trade association The Renewable Energy Association 1
Private companies/
organizations
Vivid Economics and The National Grid 3
Trade union The National Farmers Union 1
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Exchange featuring in the afforestation actor list. Most documents in the
corpus address both BECCS and afforestation together rather than in iso-
lation: of twenty-eight documents, BECCS features in twenty-one and
afforestation in twenty.
Reports by the UK’s Committee on Climate Change (CCC), a statutory
government advisory body created under the Climate Change Act, were
cited in almost all documents. Both the CCC (2019) and the Royal Society
(Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering 2018) reports present
comprehensive assessments of the UK’s total CDR potential and the feasi-
bility of BECCS and afforestation alongside a range of other CDR
approaches. Both reports offer assessments of quantities of CDR from
BECCS and afforestation specified in terms of Mt CO2 pa (millions of tons
of CO2 per year) by 2050. The CCC project CDR removals from BECCS of
between 20 and 51 Mt CO2 pa and up to 22 Mt CO2 pa afforestation from
afforestation (between 15 percent and 17 percent increase in forest cover).
The Royal Society specifies total feasible CDR removals from the UK at
130 Mt CO2 pa, with removals from BECCS ranging from 20 to 70 Mt CO2
pa and afforestation removing 15 Mt CO2 pa. Given the authoritative status
of these targets amongst UK-based actors, it is notable that the CCC’s Net
Zero report explicitly distances itself from the assumptions about BECCS
made in the scenarios of the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment (pp. 26, 98). This
distancing move highlights the epistemic ambiguity of global climate
assessments, long discussed by STS researchers (Jasanoff et al. 1998), and
suggests that disputes over CDR targets may have as much to do with the
contested political authority of assessment regimes as their scientific
legitimacy.
In analyzing how the feasibility of BECCS and afforestation is evi-
denced and contested, we identified three “devices” widely used to engage
debates about CDR. These devices appear central to the capacity of actors to
engage with debates about CDR and also highlight the particular kinds of
techno-economic expertise required to participate.
Carbon Accounting Techniques
The majority of documents in the corpus either utilize or contest the CDR
projections of the CCC and Royal Society reports as the basis for their
claims about BECCS and afforestation. Those adopting the CCC’s CDR
targets include the Renewable Energy Association (2019), the Woodland
Trust (2020), and the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee
(2019). In contrast, WWF (2019) contest the CCC’s targets for CDR,
18 Science, Technology, & Human Values XX(X)
projecting a net-zero target for 2045 that could involve far lower rates of
removal from BECCS (as low as 15 Mt CO2 pa) and more radical “behavior
change” in society. Another approach is taken by Rewilding Britain (2019)
who draws on the CCC’s analysis but focuses only on removals from
natural climate solutions (total 47 Mt CO2 pa), arguing that BECCS risks
creating land-use conflicts. Elsewhere, the National Farmers’ Union (2019)
makes clear its support for the government target and includes CDR
targets—BECCS 22 Mt CO2 pa, afforestation 0.7 Mt CO2 pa—though the
report neither references any external sources nor clarifies how these targets
are calculated.
The accounting concept of “net zero” is also used more discursively.
Greenpeace’s (2019) Climate Manifesto, an intervention in the UK’s
general election of that year, uses the term “net zero” throughout but cites
neither the CCC’s nor the Royal Society’s CDR assessments and makes no
claims about absolute (or relative) quantities of CO2 removals. Green-
peace’s conspicuously discursive use of the concept might appear disen-
gaged from carbon accounting perspectives on CDR. However, it is notable
that complexities of carbon accounting are not discussed in depth by any
report in the corpus with the exception of the CCC’s Net Zero report which
dedicates several chapters to the contingencies involved in calculating UK
CDR targets, including the role international negotiations play in emissions
reduction commitments, radiative forcing associated with different green-
house gases, and the problem of not counting “consumption emissions.”
Discursive uses of the term “net zero” may not engage with carbon account-
ing techniques but arguably also highlight how positivist approaches to
CDR accounting can obscure the ways these measures are shaped in inter-
actions between climate science and politics.
Scenarios and Counter-scenarios
Scenarios are a key device through which reports in the core corpus assess
the feasibility of BECCS and afforestation to achieve CDR. The CCC’s
(2019) Net Zero scenarios are described as Core, Further Ambition Options
and Speculative Options, calculating the potential for emissions reductions
in different economic sectors and the related quantities of “engineered” CO2
removals from BECCS. In the CCC’s scenarios, removals relating to affor-
estation are treated as part of the “land sector” rather than as “engineered.”
The Royal Society’s scenarios, by contrast, simply comprise one Global
and one UK focused which are nevertheless treated by some actors as
authoritative assessments of overall technical potentials (e.g., Centre for
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Climate Change Economics and Policy 2019). Both of these approaches to
scenario construction privilege quantitative comparison between different
CDR approaches.
In contrast, the corpus also contains what we describe as “counter-
scenarios” insofar as they reject simple quantitative comparison (e.g., a
scale of ambition) and foreground social distinctions between different
approaches to carbon sequestration. Two scenarios in WWF’s (2019)
report, for instance, are titled “UK action” and “Collaborative action,”
highlighting challenges of considering the UK’s CO2 emissions in isolation.
Similarly, scenarios developed by the Woodland Trust (2020) describe two
different approaches to afforestation: “Dash for Carbon” and
“Nature@Work.” Counter-scenarios can also be found in a National Grid
(2019) report that develops two primary energy transition scenarios, titled
“Community Renewables” and “2 Degrees”—describing localized and
centralized approaches, respectively—and a “Net Zero” scenario, a compo-
site of the two that includes CDR from BECCS (from bioelectricity) and
“natural climate solutions,” principally reforestation. These
counter-scenarios challenge the notion that CDR via BECCS and afforesta-
tion is fungible in the way assumed in techno-economic analysis (McLaren
et al. 2019) and therefore draw attention to the artifice involved in making
these two approaches commensurable.
Demonstration Projects
Demonstration projects have been widely seen as critical to the innovation
of CDR approaches (Nemet et al. 2018), and in 2019, UK funding councils
announced a joint call for demonstrator projects (UK Research and Innova-
tion 2019). Within the corpus of literature two demonstration projects relat-
ing to BECCS and afforestation stand out as a focus of debate about the
feasibility of CDR: (1) a BECCS demonstration by power company Drax
(an actor that is visible in the web publicity maps, see Figure 1) and (2) the
New Northern Forest project backed by the UK government. We briefly
describe here how these demonstration projects are addressed in the corpus
to evidence and contest CDR projections.
In December 2018, the UK power company Drax launched what it
claimed was the first demonstration of BECCS in Europe (Drax 2019). The
demonstration is based at its former coal power station, currently, the larg-
est electricity-producing power station in the UK, and involves capturing,
but not storing, CO2 produced from bioenergy production (Drax 2019). In
the last decade, Drax has converted four of its six units to burn biomass,
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making it the largest biomass energy producer in the world, relying primar-
ily on imports in pellet form from the Southern United States. Drax was also
a leading actor in the ill-fated 2012 White Rose demonstration project that
applied for funding under the UK government’s abortive 2012-2016
£1 billion competition for CCS demonstration projects (National Audit
Office 2017). Drax pulled out of the White Rose project citing reasons
relating to business models that did not allow the capture of CO2 to be
treated separately from its transport and storage (Business, Energy & Indus-
trial Strategy Committee 2019). These demonstration projects have
provided a focus for political contestation around BECCS in the UK on
two principle fronts: first, the sustainability of imported biomass (i.e., its
classification as a “carbon neutral” energy source; Biofuel Watch 2015;
CCC 2018a) and, second, the failure of government programs to stimulate
the development of CCS infrastructure (Business, Energy & Industrial
Strategy Committee 2019; National Audit Office 2017). While several
documents in the corpus oppose the large-scale importing of biomass for
BECCS (Greenpeace 2019; Rewilding Britain 2019), none challenge the
perceived need to rapidly develop CCS technologies.
A flagship project of proposed afforestation in the UK is the so-called
Northern Forest (Woodland Trust 2018). The project is treated by a range of
documents in the corpus as demonstrating the potential for afforestation in
the UK to contribute to CDR (CCC 2018b; Royal Society and Royal Acad-
emy of Engineering 2018). Despite this, the announcement of the project in
2018 by the then Prime Minister Theresa May did not proclaim it as a CDR
demonstration but principally as a boost for economic prospects in northern
England (UK Government 2018). A key feature of the project is its govern-
ance which is not centralized in a single institution: the “forest” is not
conceptualized as a single continuous entity but rather as multiple tree
planting efforts distributed across a geographic region that may include
urban tree planting (Woodland Trust 2018). In broader policy debate, the
issue of land-use change for tree planting is highlighted as critical in deter-
mining the capacity of forests to perform CDR (CCC 2018b; Natural
Capital Committee 2020). However, despite all major political parties mak-
ing explicit promises relating to planting trees in the UK’s 2019 general
election, there has so far been very limited engagement with questions of
how the land required will be identified (Friends of the Earth 2020).
The analysis presented here highlights that UK-based actors appearing
on opposing sides of online maps (e.g., Rewilding Britain and Drax) deploy
common devices such as carbon accounting techniques and scenarios
(although not necessarily their own) to evidence and contest claims about
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the feasibility of CDR. These devices illustrate that much engagement with
BECCS and afforestation does not neatly fit into oppositional framings of
CDR debates. Both BECCS and afforestation require large-scale land-use
change and it is notable that virtually all actors, even those promoting
rewilding, justify land use principally in economic terms. The devices of
engagement identified therefore typically imply techno-economic exper-
tise. This fact is also apparent, as noted, by the conspicuous presence of
the consultancy Vivid Economics, as an author of several documents in the
corpus. While these devices of the engagement construct the basis for
organizing science-policy interactions, they also empower certain kinds
of expertise. As Greenpeace’s more discursive use of the term “net zero”
highlights, overly reductive techno-economic approaches have the potential
to contribute to perceived trade-offs between CDR and ongoing climate
mitigation (see also Cox, Spence, and Pidgeon 2020; Markusson, McLaren,
and Tyfield 2018).
Discussion and Conclusions
Attempts to locate publics concerned with CDR developments, and articu-
late their views, have been undertaken by a variety of social scientists—as
well as government agencies, industry, and civil society groups—often
through invited public engagement formats and perceptions studies (see
Waller et al. 2020). In this paper, we have moved beyond such accounts
by searching for issue publics emerging from interactions between actors
already engaging with CDR and related topics, deploying emerging STS
approaches to mapping controversies and engagement. Our analysis finds
traces of issue publics that suggest controversies over CDR, which currently
center on actors with techno-economic expertise, are unlikely to be contain-
able within science-policy institutions and governance frameworks; not
least because organizing categories distinguishing natural from engineered
CDR appear both politicized and flexibly used practice. We now discuss
three main insights from our analysis in terms of the dynamics of emerging
controversies around BECCS and afforestation, the question of public
involvement with these controversies, and implications for digital methods
as approaches for mapping controversies, publics and public issues in
emerging areas of technoscience.
Controversies over CDR have been widely framed as contestations over
the role of technological solutions in addressing future climate change. In
techno-economic assessments, which predominate in climate policy analy-
sis (Waller et al. 2020), the problem of public engagement is externalized as
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one of legitimating policy options and constructing the social basis for
acceptance of technological and environmental change. Our findings
suggest that such externalization may contribute to further antagonisms
over the scientific credibility of CDR, working against the aims of involv-
ing publics in climate policy processes. Distinctions between natural and
engineered CDR are, as our analysis shows, invoked in different ways by a
variety of actors engaged with the two CDR approaches studied here,
BECCS and afforestation. In many policy-focused accounts, such as the
assessments of the UK’s CCC, these distinctions simply map onto different
sectors in carbon accounting frameworks. In more partisan accounts, such
as those of actors promoting NCS approaches as normatively desirable, they
represent a critique of the notion that CO2 removals are fungible, counting
equally regardless of the removal method. In both policy-focused and more
partisan accounts, BECCS has provided the primary object of controversy
and often a metonym for engineered CDR. Afforestation is typically eval-
uated as having a higher “technology readiness level” or is treated as a
long-standing “natural solution” and therefore a CDR method that is proven
rather than speculative (i.e., unlike BECCS).
A key finding of our analysis, however, is that in practice much actor
engagement does not map neatly onto oppositions between natural and
engineered CDR. Controversies over CDR, we suggest, are neither easily
reducible to disagreements over policy options nor explained away by
reference to “irrational” social forces (e.g., nefarious motivations of actors
promoting climate engineering). Rather, we suggest that CDR controversies
amplify epistemic ambiguities around knowledge of climate change and
challenge tendencies in both climate policy and activism to impose strict
demarcations between scientific problems and public issues (Jasanoff et al.
1998; Geden 2016; Pallett and Chilvers 2013). Our findings therefore pro-
vide empirical support for arguments that the problem of constructing polit-
ically independent assessments of climate change is not only a matter of
governance but inseparably a social and epistemological concern about the
ways in which topics like CDR become defined as issues for scientific
assessment (Beck and Mahony 2018).
Controversies over CDR thus raise questions about the issues that should
be taken into account when assessing the role of CDR in climate futures.
Our analysis maps a fractured picture of engagement with CDR. Afforesta-
tion and BECCS actors share an interest in carbon sequestration, but in their
self-publicity on the web, they appear to align quite differently in relation to
competing keywords. In both online and off-line analysis, we found evi-
dence of substantive engagement with CDR amongst elite actors across
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policy, industry, and civil society. However, such engagement is both
highly organized and reliant on devices that privilege techno-economic
expertise. From this, it appears that widespread public involvement is not
yet evident around CDR, despite our analysis coinciding with a period of
heighted popular public debate and engagement in climate politics more
broadly (e.g., Hulme 2019).
Limited public engagement with CDR is not necessarily simply
explained by a lack of awareness, as often highlighted by perceptions stud-
ies (Thomas, Pidgeon, and Roberts 2018). Our analysis has shown how it
may also plausibly reflect a decision to disengage (e.g., in the case of
afforestation actors or Greenpeace) from framings of CDR as a climate
solution, or key forms of publicity (e.g., carbon accounting, scenarios, and
demonstrators) acting as devices of disengagement. In addition to feasibility
issues identified in public and stakeholder perception studies of CDR (e.g.,
themes like equity and justice, land-use conflicts, naturalness: Cox, Spence,
and Pidgeon 2020; Forster et al. 2020; see also Waller et al. 2020), through
opening up to the ways in which actors are already engaging, our analysis
has traced issues that arguably more closely emphasize the situated politics
of CDR. Issues raised in our analysis of documents include contestation
over how climate futures involving BECCS/afforestation are socially orga-
nized (whether centralized or distributed, involving more or less social
change, and so on), what gets excluded from assessments (e.g., “hidden”
supply chain and overseas emissions), the hybridity of BECCS and affor-
estation including complexities of land use, through to questioning the
assumed techno-economic basis of CDR itself. Our study thus emphasizes
how all attempts to search for a public are partial, format participation and
public issues in different ways, and should be viewed as part of wider
ecologies of public engagement and publicity dynamics, in this case, around
CDR and wider climate politics (Chilvers, Pallett, and Hargreaves 2018).
The web has often been described as an “anticipatory medium” (see
discussion in Rogers 2013) and the issue mapping approach developed in
this study aimed, in part, to anticipate issues likely to shape future devel-
opments in CDR. By mixing web-querying with document analysis, our
mixed-methods approach compared the “coarse signs” generated by
web-queries against a politically situated debate. In contrast to the findings
of many digital methods studies, particularly on climate-related issues
(Chilvers, Pallett, and Hargreaves 2018; Pearce et al. 2019; Rogers and
Marres 2000; Venturinni et al. 2014), we identified few actors that could
not be easily classified within an “off-the-shelf” typology of policy
actor-types. The exceptions were predominantly science-society
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intermediary organizations, highlighting that even web-based material on
afforestation and BECCS is highly science-centric. In part, these results
likely reflect ongoing changes in web design toward platform architectures
and away from websites as the primary mediators of online social interac-
tion (Rogers 2013, 2018). But they also highlight the challenge of repurpos-
ing digital media-technologies to map issues where the objects of
controversy, in our case BECCS and afforestation, are conspicuously arti-
facts of an assessment regime. That our search for documents returned items
predominantly published by policy elites arguably reveals much about the
ways in which BECCS and afforestation currently both perform as technol-
ogies that enable policy actors to (all too easily) “solve” the problem of
governing the changing climate. To a certain extent, the maps presented
here could be read as tracing the contours of an emerging field of climate
policy. But, as the results of an issue mapping study, we argue that our
findings can also be read more critically as illustrating the provincial char-
acter of much current debate about CDR and evidencing the tendencies of
policy elites to prioritize problem-framings amenable to techno-economic




BECCS bioenergy with carbon capture and storage
CCC UK Committee on Climate Change
CDR carbon dioxide removal
IPCC UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
NCS natural climate solutions
Appendix B
Sources of UK-based Actor Literatures
Membership organizations/bodies.
 Climate Action Network
 Climate Coalition
 Renewable Energy Association
 UK Carbon Capture and Storage Association
 National Farmers Union
 Countryside Land and Business Association
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 Tree Council
 Wildlife and Countryside Link
 Market Research Society




 International Center for Climate Governance (ICCG)—UK climate
think tanks list
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1. A list of acronyms used can be found in Appendix A.
2. In line with a range of other research on carbon dioxide removal (CDR; Minx
et al. 2018), we treat afforestation and reforestation here together.
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3. Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and afforestation actor
lists are available on request.
4. The literature corpus is available on request.
5. The Search Engine Scraper is developed by the Digital Methods Initiative at the
University of Amsterdam (see https://digitalmethods.net).
6. By intermediary websites, we mean those sites that principally host or publish
information. This includes, for instance, news and other media sites, social
networks, publishing platforms, encyclopaedia and dictionary sites, and wikis.
While we recognize that this is a reductive way of classifying such diverse sites,
which are not equally passive and can even become configured as actors in
controversies, in the current analysis, we consider it necessary for the purposes
of generating “coarse signs” for a social analysis.
7. Combined they account for approx. 40 percent of results based on the coding of
test queries. These results were filtered out in the screening process, but we note
them here as highlighting centrality of science to controversies over CDR.
8. To automate this process, we used a tool called the Lippmannian Device (see
https://digitalmethods.net). We only count actual results returned by Bing and
do not use “estimated results” returned because it is unclear how Bing’s esti-
mates are calculated. To validate results, we triangulated results from Bing with
manual queries on Google.
9. Alongside the two dominant framings of CDR (as “negative emissions” and
natural climate solutions), we also included the term “carbon sequestration” to
examine the resonance across these lists of a term for CDR that is neither
obviously scientifically or politically controversial.
10. In scientific discourse, “natural climate solutions” are often defined as a subset
of “nature-based solutions” (see https://www.naturebasedsolutionsinitiative.o
rg/what-are-nature-based-solutions/, accessed September 7, 2020). However,
in the following analysis, we foreground “natural climate solutions” due to the
prominence of the term in climate change media publicity (see Introduction
section). Results for the search query [“natural climate solutions”] here include
results for the query [“nature-based climate solutions”] and the latter typically
retuned higher numbers of results. We justify this on the basis that although not
synonyms in scientific discourses, the terms both privilege land-stewardship
approaches to carbon sequestration in contrast to engineered approaches to car-
bon removal.
11. Themes and questions for analyzing “real-world feasibility” of afforestation and
BECCS in documents collected included evidence and claims of CDR; stated
meanings and definitions of BECCS/afforestation; relation to key terms of
“negative emissions” and “nature-based solutions”/“natural climate solutions”;
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and specification of climate futures, including through pathways and scenarios.
A full list of the themes and questions is available on request.
12. For instance, https://www.shell.com/energy-and-innovation/the-energy-future/
colours/the-day-the-earths-co2-stands-still.html (accessed September 7, 2020).
13. For example, https://www.fern.org/news-resources/what-are-negative-emissio
ns-2175/ (accessed September 7, 2020).
14. There are thirty-four UK-based actors on the BECCS online actor list and
fourteen on the afforestation actor list.
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